Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky pretty rude reaction News that his country would not receive a firm timetable for NATO membership made headlines at the alliance summit in Vilnius last week. Of lesser attention, but perhaps of more immediate importance, is the mismatch between allied forces in Eastern Europe and their strategies for countering the Russian threat.

Since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO has progressed fairly slowly in adapting its force structure in Eastern Europe. In 2016, the Alliance began strengthening its forward presence with plans to deploy rotating battlegroups in its eastern member states. Within a year, four multinational forces of approximately 1,200 troops each arrived in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. After Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine last year, the alliance expanded its eFP, expanding its existing force to as many as 1,900 troops and sending new troops to Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania.

At the June 2022 alliance summit, NATO also changed its strategy to counter Russian aggression. Alliance members decided not to fight to slow the enemy’s advance until more friendly forces could join the battle, but to work to deny any and all gains in allied territory.

However, eFP units deployed across Eastern Europe are not fit for purpose due to their size, capabilities, interoperability and responsiveness. In the event of a crisis, you will need reinforcements from across the continent (and pond). But NATO leaders may be hesitant to deploy before the invasion to avoid a perceived escalation, and will struggle to deploy after the invasion, given Europe’s impediment to military mobility.

The situation is particularly problematic given Russia’s decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and reports that Wagner may also reconfigure in Belarus. The question remains: how can NATO prevent Vilnius, Tallinn, Riga or any other allied city from becoming the next bucha?

To pursue a denial strategy, NATO must address four major shortcomings of the eFP by the next summit in Washington in 2024.

First, the eFP unit needs to be larger. NATO doesn’t need to match forces with Russians across its borders, but it does need to get close to it in the Baltics and Poland. Her eFP forces in these four countries should be a full brigade of approximately 4,000-5,000 men. On the other hand, it remains a mystery why the Alliance thinks Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria need land-based eFP forces of any size, and while a Russian ground force invasion seems unlikely, these resources would be better spent elsewhere. And as for Romanian forces, given the nature of the Russian threat in the Black Sea region, NATO should shift its objectives and structure from land domain defense to intelligence, counter-electronic warfare and anti-submarine operations.

Second, the eFP unit lacks the functionality required to implement a rejection strategy. For example, NATO air security missions currently operate 24/7, but with limited scope. Similarly, eFP units often lack cutting-edge electronic warfare capabilities that are known to be a strength of the Russian military. Incorporating integrated air and missile defense, anti-UAV, defensive and offensive electronic warfare capabilities into the eFP force would enhance its ability to deter an initial Russian acquisition in any surprise attack.

Third, the multinational nature of some eFP forces undermines their ability to operate effectively. A lack of common equipment, various operational restrictions imposed by multiple contributing countries, and differing English proficiency hinder interoperability below the battalion level. Multinationality reflects the cohesion of the entire alliance, but post-2022 Europe will need to prioritize military effectiveness over political signals. Therefore, NATO should not allow eFP contributions of less than a full battalion (up to about 1,000 troops).

Finally, eFP units do not have a single, completely consistent readiness standard. For example, in some cases eFP subunits do not conduct collective training prior to being dispatched to one of the host nations. In other cases, it is different what participating countries contribute to each eFP rotation. Also, in some cases, subunit rotation continues for different periods of time, compromising cohesion. All of this hinders efforts to achieve “fight tonight” readiness with all his eFP forces. To fix this, NATO will need to develop a single eFP response standard tailored to the unique defense challenges faced by each eFP host country, yet it will be evaluated intensively by the Alliance’s Strategic Commands in Mons, Belgium and Norfolk, Virginia.

Given the vital importance of the eFP’s mission, no time can be wasted preparing for next year’s Washington summit, which marks the alliance’s 75th anniversary. Enhancement and refinement of eFP should be high on the list of potential agenda items. Now, by presenting a roadmap for improvement and improvement, the Alliance can deliver on its promise of denying the right to collective self-defense.

Gabriella RA Doyle is a Non-Resident Fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Trans-Atlantic Security Initiative.

John R. Denni is a research professor at the Institute for Strategic Studies, U.S. Army War College, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and an associate fellow at the NATO Defense College.he is the author of NATO and Article 5 (Lowman & Littlefield, 2017).

This article is written by the author in his personal capacity. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policies, opinions or positions of the employer.