The United States faces a fundamental deterrence problem in Taiwan. A recent poll of more than 2,500 American adults found that less than half would support direct U.S. military intervention if China invaded the autonomous islands. But for deterrence to succeed, we must recognize that the adversary has both capabilities and capabilities. will to carry out their threats.

Questions have already been raised as to whether US forces are equipped to defend Taiwan and take it back if necessary. In recent well-publicized war games, US victories can result in the loss of dozens of ships, the loss of hundreds of aircraft, and the loss of thousands of US military lives in a matter of weeks. found. This may give Chinese President Xi Jinping reason to believe that the United States lacks the will to defend Taiwan — if it were not for the presidency of President Joe Biden, the United States would You have said many times that you would intervene militarily on behalf of the as soon as his successor takes office.

The United States has various tools of power available for deterrence, including extensive diplomatic relations, alliance networks, and economic and financial carrots and sticks. An obvious solution to the US credibility problem, therefore, is the DoD-led concept of joint deterrence. That is, “a seamless combination of the ability to convince potential adversaries that the costs of adversarial activities outweigh the benefits through the integration of cross-domain efforts.” “Across the Region” “Across the Sphere of Conflict” “Across the U.S. Government” “Along with Allies and Partners”.

But if deterrence requires coordination among governments of allies and partners (many of whom are not interested in fighting China), then an organization primarily tasked with preparing for war with China is at the forefront. to send the wrong message. It also unnecessarily views the competition between the United States and China as hostile and underestimates an important non-military instrument of power.

hammer time

It should come as no surprise that the Department of Defense is at the forefront of the United States’ joint deterrence mission. Modern deterrence theory was born as a military concept. Even if that weren’t the case, in recent years many traditionally non-military activities have become militarized as the “military has become everything”. A recent good example is its leading role in emergency air transportation of infant formula.

The militarization of this traditional non-military activity has consequences. As the saying goes, if you only have a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

As for strategic deterrence, the military threat alone seems to work quite well. Fortunately, few leaders seem enthusiastic about global thermonuclear warfare. However, successful strategic deterrence does not always translate well to local conventional levels. Long-range US military threats to defend non-aligned nations often lack the credibility necessary for effective deterrence.

The phrase “integrative deterrence” provides a useful cognitive distance from previous notions of deterrence. This makes clear that most effective deterrence requires the deliberate use of non-U.S. non-military resources. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense’s leading role in total deterrence indicates that this cognitive distance is not reflected in U.S. thinking to U.S. action.

U(S) can’t touch this

For Xi Jinping, the Taiwan gamble involves his achievements and the party’s promise of national rejuvenation. Meanwhile, the U.S. engagement with Taiwan reported to Mr. Xi, ostensibly about democracy, spanned four decades until Taipei held its first fully free parliamentary elections in 1992, shaking off authoritarianism. Except that it enjoyed the support of the US government. I am in favor of defending Taiwan on the basis of the importance of free and open shipping and air routes, but given that the Chinese economy is heavily dependent on trade with Taiwan, once the island is seized , except that China would have good reason to allow shipping and air travel to resume as normal. growth.

Controlling microchip manufacturing is a more well-founded concern, at least in the short term. But the United States and its European allies are investing heavily in developing a stronger microchip industry to reduce their reliance on Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing companies. If these US and European efforts succeed, what will happen to Taiwan’s TSMC’s “silicon shield”?

China is also working to move away from its reliance on Taiwanese microchips since at least 2020, when TSMC was barred from shipping chips to Chinese telecom giant Huawei. Sooner or later, cracks will start to appear in Taiwan’s “silicon shield.”

Xi, meanwhile, has options other than aggression. What is blockade? Is it possible to respond like Berlin Airlift? Some flights during Operation Bittles were as short as 110 miles. The distance from Taiwan to the nearest non-Chinese airfield is about ten times that. A non-military response would be more likely. If the Pentagon were to take the lead, it would be difficult to tell in advance as part of the United States’ joint deterrence package.

stop hammer time

Indeed, any deterrence strategy must include a hammer that the Pentagon can wield. But beyond the issue of effectiveness in deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, overreliance on military and securitization in general is likely to have far-reaching adverse effects on U.S. relations in the Indo-Pacific. Americans risk becoming the “Hessians of Asia” by taking a security-first approach in the region.

To prevent this, joint deterrence needs to give more equal weight to non-military and non-U.S. elements. In a recent report, my colleagues and I proposed doing this by tying joint deterrence to the concept of a formal bilateral influence capability. The United States’ ability to coerce and deter others is thereby a product of a series of economic, political, and security factors. It is based on policy-making instruments that can be leveraged not only bilaterally, but also through a network of allies and partners. Such an approach, if successful, would bring “collective resilience” to the United States and its partners.

Even if the U.S. denial deterrence strategy regarding Taiwan is unconvincing to Xi Jinping, especially given China’s heavy reliance on the U.S. and several allies in hundreds of critical military areas, the U.S. and its partners The resilience of the deterrent should be convincing. Product. In this regard, if China’s imports to the United States and Europe continue to fall sharply and steadily, China’s leaders will either “further increase infrastructure investment (and the country’s debt burden), or else increase unemployment.” It will be forced to make a difficult choice that there is no choice but to accept

China’s debt is already sizable, and many of its major debt holders (local governments surrounded by real estate) have little ability to repay their debts. China is also in the midst of a youth unemployment crisis. So neither rising debt nor rising unemployment are good options for the Chinese leadership, which could face a crisis of legitimacy and even threaten Mr. Xi’s survival if he were to face a massive economic blow after the invasion. There is even sex.

It will be difficult to persuade partners and allies to act in concert with the United States to prevent an invasion of Taiwan. A recent survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations found that the majority of more than 16,000 respondents in 11 European countries believe their countries should remain neutral in the event of a US-China conflict over Taiwan. It became clear that Changing the tide of European public opinion will require a great deal of diplomatic effort, and that effort is unsuitable for the Pentagon.

The National Security Council is an obvious candidate to lead the United States’ joint deterrence effort, given its primary mandate of interagency control. Of course, the NSC would need to assign enforcement duties to organizations such as the Department of Defense, but NSC coordination would allow the Department of State to play a greater role than just the Treasury Department. Military options will continue to be available, not as a first resort.

2 legal 2 stop

Deterrence is an imperfect technology and any approach to integrated deterrence can fail. De-emphasizing the DoD’s role in joint deterrence greatly increases the credibility of the U.S. threat and increases its chances of success. And even if China cannot be deterred – after all, economic and diplomatic threats did not stop Russian aggression against Ukraine – the US, China and Taiwan will soft-land on the other side of the “brink”. It will be .

Meanwhile, calls for strengthening Taiwan’s defense capabilities and U.S. capabilities to respond to potential hostilities across the Taiwan Strait have apparently been heeded. These are important and necessary steps. However, there is likely to be some question as to whether to use these features. By removing the leadership of the U.S. joint deterrence strategy from the Department of Defense and instead treating its metaphorical hammer as one of many tools, the U.S. will harness its will to act and its array of national power instruments. and acquire the ability to act in a coordinated manner. There will be far fewer questions.

Colin Meisel is Associate Director of Geopolitical Analysis at the Frederick S. Purdy Center for International Futures at the Joseph Corbell School of International Studies at the University of Denver. He is also a geopolitical and modeling expert at The Hague Center for Strategic Studies and an adjunct research fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center for Strategic Foresight Hub.